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The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks 
generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the 
manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in 
banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the 
allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the 
ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that 
a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk. 
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I.  Introduction  
Most of banking activities involve risk. But, more important than determining its 
type is establishing the sources that explain the risk taken by banks in its lending 
operations. Cross countries differences in banking risk are usually attributed to financial 
regulations represented by the deposit insurance, capital requirements and some other 
restrictions. But within countries are required additional criteria further than that related 
to financial regulations and the idiosyncratic component to address this matter. 
Several empirical studies have pointed the ownership structure as the main culprit 
of the differences in risk among banking institutions, since it determines whether or not 
the capital owners are able to control the managerial decisions (Saunders, Strock and 
Travlos 1990, Anderson and Fraser 2000, Caprio and Levine 2002, García and Robles 
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2008). However, other elements such as the market competition and banking size could 
also contribute in shaping risk. 
The property of Banks can be in hands of few or lots of investors. As Laeven and 
Levine (2009) and the Corporate Governance theory suggest, the capacity of owners to 
guide managers’ decisions concerning risk depends on the banking property distribution. 
The higher the ownership concentration the higher will be the risk in a banking 
institution, since capital owners obligate the manager to increase profits by seeking 
higher levels of risk. Conversely, in banks with a low property concentration, the 
separation between the ownership and the control of capital lead to a problem of 
corporate governance that consists in the mismatch of the preferences for risk among 
shareholders and the manager. According to Caprio and Levine (2002), small 
shareholders fail to exert corporate control on managerial decisions by two main reasons. 
The monitoring costs to control the manager are extremely high, so that, shareholders 
have no option than accepting his portfolio decisions. Second, the shareholders may lack 
of voting rights or are not properly represented in the management board, which 
empowers the manager with absolute control over risk. In absence of a compensation 
scheme additional to the salary, the manager usually adopts a risk adverse position in 
controlling the capital by selecting a more conservative but less profitable portfolio. 
The type of banking investors could also represent an extra source of risk 
disparities among institutions, since banks can be private or publicly owned. According 
to García and Robles (2008) government owned banking institutions lead to higher levels 
of risks by conceding more credits to finance projects of their specific interests, and at 
more flexible conditions than those offered elsewhere.  
Likewise, lending operations crucially depend on the size of the banking firm and 
the actions taken by other market competitors.  
Concerning the Banking operating scale, the related literature had identified two 
conflicting effects on risk. The argument of a negative association between size and risk 
affirms that banks of large size may finance riskier credits without entering in immediate 
problems of liquidity. Besides, their portfolios are more diversified representing higher 
proceeds than those perceived by smaller institutions (Saunders, Strock and Travlos 1990, 
Boyd and Runkle 1993, Demsetz and Strahan 1997, and Anderson and Fraser 2000).  A 3 
 
positive association between banking size and risk is based on the premise “Too big to 
fail”, which asserts that the deposit insurance measure, used by regulators to guarantee 
the stability of the banking system, may have a perverse effect since large banks may 
have incentives to choose riskier portfolios (Chumacero and Langoni 2001, and García 
and Robles 2008). 
In addition to the mentioned above, the type of market could affect the banking risk 
by affecting the interest rates (Caprio and Levine 2002, Boyd and De Nicoló 2005, Boyd, 
De Nicoló and Jalal 2006, and Nicoló and Loukoianova 2007). According to Boyd and 
De Nicoló (2005), this variable could have two opposing effects. From one side, a high 
market concentration (low competition) reduces the interest rates paid to deposits, which 
increase profits, and allows risk reductions. From the other side, a market with low 
competition leads to increments in the interest rates charged to credits, generating a 
profits reduction by the nonperforming loans growth, which obligates the manager to 
increase risk. 
In order to determine the main sources of risk in Colombian banks we empirically 
test three hypotheses: 
i)  A concentrated banking property leads to higher risk;  
ii)  Banking size and risk are negatively associated; 
iii)  An increasing market competition reduces the corporate governance problem, 
also implying higher levels of risk. 
In this paper we study the banking risk as a function of the ownership structure, size 
and the market competition along with some traditional banking variables for Colombia. 
Our estimations for data between 1989 and 2009 for banks and CAVS (Savings and 
Housing Corporations) coincide with previous results in the financial literature, related to 
these variables as the main sources of risk. 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to investigate the differences in 
Colombian banking risk using the ownership structure. Our empirical results suggest that 
risk is higher in ownership concentrated and large size banks; but decreases with the 
variable of market competition. In essence, banking risk depends on the side that controls 
the capital (manager or owners), but the operating scale and the actions taken by other 
market competitors have also relevant effects. 4 
 
This paper is divided into four sections, including this introduction. Sections II and 
III contain the variables constructed, a general analysis on data, and the model and the 
estimation method conducted. The results and final remarks are presented in Section IV. 
 
 
II.  Data  
The Savings and Housing corporations (CAVS) began to partake in the financial 
market in 1972, following a government policy which purpose was to stimulate the 
construction sector by financing the domestic housing acquisition. In 1993 a government 
reform (Law 35/1993) approved that, in addition to the housing market, CAVS could also 
grant credits for consumption, which permitted them compete as equal with banks in the 
markets of credits and deposits. By the end of 90’s and the beginning of 2000 some 
CAVS were acquired by banks, others became banks, and quite a few were liquidated due 
to solvency problems
2. For these reasons we considered banks and CAVS similar 
institutions in the domestic financial market. 
We used yearly data for Colombian banks and CAVS between 1989 and 2009 from 
the Profit and Loss Statements, Balance Sheets and the First Level Shareholders registers 
reported by each banking institution to Superfinanciera
3. 
As dependent variable, we computed an ex-post measure of credit risk (RISK) that 
is explained by the ratio of non-performing loans to total Loans. We recognize that other 
measures of risk based on the Market risk approach could allow the identification of the 
specific risk of each entity and the risk related to the market. However, that measure 
could be underestimating the total banking risk in Colombia since quite a few banks are 
trading their shares in the local Stock Exchange Market.  
The Banking ownership structure is analyzed in several ways. First, we constructed 
a Herfindhal Hirschman index of shares concentration per bank, termed OWNER_HHI. 
As the index moves towards unity an extreme concentration in shares emerges implying a 
                                                 
2 The domestic market of credits has been supplied by a variable number of banking institutions. During the 
90s its total number averaged 37, but with a non-trivial increase of 4 institutions between 1994 and 1997. 
The changing nature in CAVS in the beginning of 2000 along with the banking mergers, acquisitions and 
liquidations entailed a fall in the number banks from 29 in 2002 to 18 in 2009. 
3 The Financial Superintendence “Superfinanciera” is a governmental organism that exerts control, 
supervises and regulates banking and financial operations.  5 
 
bank under the control of its owners. The higher the index of shares concentration, the 
stronger would be the pressure exerted by major owners over managers to increase 
profits, by increasing risk. 
Besides the property concentration, we considered two dummy variables in terms of 
the type of capital invested. The Dum_foreign takes the value of one for banks with 
more than 50% of its capital shares in hands of foreign investors and zero otherwise. In a 
similar way, the Dum_govern captures banks with prominent government participation 
(higher than 50%), mainly represented by public banks, banks intervened and those that 
experienced liquidation processes. 
The scale of banking operations is captured by the variable SIZE, measured as the 
natural logarithm of total Assets. To account for differences in the banking size, we 
classified banks in small and large, with the Ward’s method that we computed based in 
the natural logarithm of the total assets. For the computation of this clustering method we 
used the squared Euclidean distance, given that this alternative minimizes the loss of 
information that may result from the grouping procedure. Considering jointly the groups 
by size and the type of investors, we found that Large Banks are mostly represented by 
private capital (88.7%) and the Small banks are mainly foreign (63.2%). In regard to this 
last characteristic, we constructed an additional variable that captures the interaction 
between this group and the type of capital invested (Small & foreign). 
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Calculations by the authors. Source of data: Superfinanciera 6 
 
 
Since the mid of the 90’s the ownership concentration have been increasing for 
both banking sizes, presumably by the processes of acquisitions, liquidations and mergers 
that turned even more pronounced between the end of 1990’s and the beginning of 2000. 
But, the concentration in the banking property had been larger for small banks (Graph 1). 
We also constructed an index of market concentration (MARKET) following the 
Herfindahl Hirschman method. This index can be computed for assets and passives, since 
banks compete for credits and deposits. However, we calculated this index only for the 
assets side, because our main interest is centred on the risk of failure. From Graph 2 is 
clear that market concentration has been increasing, a trend that coincides with a decline 
in the number of banks, which passed from 34 in 2004 to 18 in 2009. 
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Additionally, we included other variables in order to control for the most traditional 
banking characteristics. The PROFITS variable is an operating margin measure that was 
constructed as lagged one year value of the ratio between net Operational incomes and 
total Assets. The LIQUIDITY indicator is represented by the ratio of Bank liquid Assets 
and total liquid Liabilities; and the Loans growth variable (LOAN) is a discrete annual 
rate of growth in the total credits. 7 
 
Notice in Table 1 that our measure of risk and the variables of ownership, Size and 
Market competition are strongly associated (at 1%). The correlation matrix also shows 
that overall risk is higher in ownership concentrated banks and in those that are of a large 
size. Conversely, risk is lower in small foreign owned banks.   
 
Table 1 Correlation matrix of variables- All banks 





MARKET ‐0.125*** 0.142*** 0.534***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dum_foreign ‐0.152*** 0.394*** ‐0.291*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dum_govern 0.181*** 0.474*** ‐0.192*** ‐0.156*** 0.237***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.651) (0.000) (0.716)
Profits ‐0.598*** ‐0.319*** ‐0.015 0.019 ‐0.020 ‐0.211***
(0.000) (0.0006) (0.123) (0.000) (0.276) (0.847)
Liquidity 0.260*** 0.154*** ‐0.047 ‐0.008 ‐0.066 0.182*** ‐0.487***
(0.000) (0.0006) (0.123) (0.000) (0.276) (0.847) (0.000)
Loan ‐0.251*** ‐0.229*** ‐0.079* ‐0.101** ‐0.019 ‐0.003 0.206*** ‐0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.614) (0.323) (0.060) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000)
Small & foreign ‐0.169*** 0.311*** ‐0.488*** ‐0.097** 0.737*** 0.160*** 0.055 ‐0.048 0.022





III.  Model and Empirical Results 
 
We empirically estimate equation (2):  
 
(2)                                                   _               
_ _ _
it it it
it it it i it
u X HHI Market SIZE
govern Dum foreign Dum HHI Owner RISK
   
    
  




Xit: is a matrix that includes all banking characteristics for bank i at time t. The 
coefficient estimates vectors are captured by β, φ, λ, δ, θ, and γ. In order to control for 
changes in the average level of risk we estimated fixed effects models; and alternatively 
we estimated models of random effects. In all specifications the Hausman test signalled 
the random effects as the appropriate model to address the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. 
In Table No. 2 we present evidence of the main determinants of banking risk. Most 
of our results are significant at 1% level, and most of them display the expected 
association with the dependent variable. 
 
Table 2 Empirical Results- All Banks 
Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Owner_hhi 0.058 0.045 0.041 0.041 0.063 0.052 0.044 0.023
(0.019)*** (0.014)*** (0.018)** (0.014)** (0.019)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)** (0.012)*
Dum_foreign ‐0.046 ‐0.040 ‐0.040 ‐0.032
(0.014)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)** (0.009)***
Size 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.006 0.008
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.03)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004) (0.003)***
Market ‐1.157 ‐1.207 ‐1.202 ‐1.237 ‐1.231 ‐1.224 ‐0.844 ‐0.910





Loan ‐ 0.067 ‐0.066 ‐0.065 ‐0.065
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
Small & foreign ‐0.006 ‐0.031
(0.018) (0.013)**
Constant ‐0.187 ‐0.179 ‐0.158 ‐0.109 ‐0.159 ‐0.130 ‐0.002 ‐0.050
(0.078)** (0.065)*** (0.075)** (0.065)* (0.074)** (0.064)** (0.076) (0.06)
Hausman test (p‐ value) 0.142 0.078 0.429 0.166
Number of observations 498 498 497 497 497 497 471 471





The overall banking risk and its ownership structure are linked by a positive and 
significant relation. Since the index of shares concentration have been increasing for all 9 
 
banks it is evident that shareholders have corporate control over the manager, exerting 
pressure to increase proceeds by opting for riskier portfolios. These results are consistent 
with previous findings of Saunders, et al (1990), Caprio and Levine (2002), and García 
and Robles (2008) according to which a high property concentration lessens the conflict 
of interests among the manager and the capital owners. Even when we controlled for 
bank specific characteristics, the positive association between property’s concentration 
and risk remains unchanged and significant. 
Concerning the Banking Size in our estimations we identified a positive and 
significant association with risk, which supports the premise “too big to fail”, but at the 
same time contradicted our second hypothesis. In essence, this outcome suggests that 
shareholders of large banks can successfully exert corporate control on managerial 
decisions. 
In relation to the market competition, our results disagree with our third hypothesis 
since we identified a negative association with risk. In regard to this outcome, we noticed 
that the effect of the market of deposits dominates, implying that the market 
concentration decrease the interest rates paid to deposits, which increases profits and 
reduces risk. 
Regarding the control variables, we identified the expected results concerning 
banking risk. As expected, a raise in the lagged one year value of profits and the growth 
rate of loans lead to risk reductions. The effect of liquidity on risk though negative is 
extremely small. 
The effects of the additional variables of ownership are as follows:  
Banks with a prominent foreign participation in their property prefer lower levels of 
risk, suggesting that managers are the capital controllers, and that their portfolio decisions 
represent risk reductions. This negative association is confirmed when we considered the 
interaction with the group of small banks, given that most of foreign banks are small in 
relation to the rest of market competitors.   
The relationship between the government participation in the banking ownership 
and risk is insignificant. A plausible explanation might be that most of Colombian 
government owned banks are those that experienced temporary interventions due to 
solvency problems. According to Laeven and Levine (2009), banks that are controlled by 10 
 
the government may not reflect the conflict of interests among the manager and owners, 
but instead, the relation between the owner (government) and their employees 
(managers). For this reason, we estimated again the model presented in equation 2 
excluding all government owned banks; and most of our results remain unchanged and 
significant (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Empirical Results- Excluding government owned banks 
Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Owner_hhi 0.031 0.022 0.034 0.028 0.023 0.021 0.024 0.021
(0.012)*** (0.011)** (0.013)*** (0.012)** (0.014)* (0.012)* (0.014)* (0.012)*
Dum_foreign ‐0.007 ‐0.011 ‐0.012 ‐0.010 ‐0.018 ‐0.013
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)** (0.012) (0.009)
Size 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016
(0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Market ‐0.535 ‐0.498 ‐0.529 ‐0.492 ‐1.014 ‐1.011 ‐1.094 ‐1.083
(0.121)*** (0.118)*** (0.121)*** (0.118)*** (0.143)*** (0.141)*** (0.139)*** (0.137)***
Liquidity ‐0.029 ‐0.027 ‐0.030 ‐0.027 ‐0.020 ‐0.017
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)**
Loan ‐0.046 ‐0.045 ‐0.046 ‐0.045
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Small & foreign 0.019 0.005
(0.012) (0.011)
Constant 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.090 ‐0.214 ‐0.202 ‐0.228 ‐0.210
(0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.048)*** (0.043)*** (0.049)*** (0.044)***
Hausman test (p‐ value) 0.067 0.061 0.461 0.085
Number of observations 429 429 429 429 430 430 431 431




However, the previously identified preference of foreign banks for portfolios of low 
risk disappears, even when we considered the joint effect of size and the origin of capital 




Corporate governance theory asserts that the ownership structure effects on banking 
portfolio and therefore on risk depends upon the side that controls the capital. Under a 11 
 
dispersed ownership the lack of corporate governance by owners empowers the manager 
with absolute control on banking capital. In absence of the pressure exerted by owners, 
the manager usually chooses a low risk portfolio. But, in a property concentrated bank, 
the owners obligate the manager to increase profits, increasing risk. In this way, a 
concentrated ownership structure lessens the conflict of interests among the manager and 
owners, but increases the risk. Our results support these arguments, but also identified 
that banking risk depends on other elements such as size and the market competition; 
even when we excluded government owned banks. 
In relation to size, we found that large banks prefer higher levels of risk, a result 
that supports the premise “too big to fail”; according to which some regulatory measures 
could generate undesirable effects on banking portfolios. Our results impeded us to go 
beyond on this subject but suggest an interesting path to explore further.  
Regarding the market variable, we found a negative effect on risk, suggesting that 
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